Reassessing Pearl Harbor: Scapegoats, a False Hero and the Myth of Surprise Attack Read online

  REASSESSING PEARL HARBOR

  Scapegoats, a False Hero and the Myth of Surprise Attack

  James Johns

  McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

  Jefferson, North Carolina

  All photographs are from the author’s collection unless noted otherwise.

  LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE

  BRITISH LIBRARY CATALOGUING DATA ARE AVAILABLE

  e-ISBN: 978-1-4766-2833-2

  © 2017 James Johns. All rights reserved

  No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

  Front cover: insets, left to right Walter Short (U.S. Department of the Interior), General Douglas Macarthur, 1945 (Library of Congress), Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (Office for Emergency Management, Office of War Information), background burning and damaged ships at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, left to right: USS Arizona, USS Tennessee and USS West Virginia (Department of the Navy, Naval Photographic Center)

  McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers

  Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina 28640

  www.mcfarlandpub.com

  For

  Ensign E. Tom Child

  Torpedo Officer, USS Cassin (DD 372)

  Pearl Harbor

  7 December 1941

  Ensign Barron W. Chandler

  Executive Officer, PT 34, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 3

  Manila Bay

  8 December 1941

  and

  First Lieutenant Lars C. Jensen

  45th Infantry, Philippine Scouts

  Ft. McKinley, Luzon

  8 December 1941

  Table of Contents

  Preface

  Principal Characters

  Introduction

  1. Dereliction of Duty

  2. Japan’s Targets

  3. The World Stage

  4. Change of Command

  5. Lend-Lease and Its Delivery

  6. Spy Warnings

  7. Negotiations

  8. Final Warnings

  9. Air Raid Pearl Harbor, This Is No Drill

  10. Aftermath and Investigations

  Chapter Notes

  Bibliography

  List of Names and Terms

  Preface

  November 25, 1941, was the thirteenth day before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Several things happened on that day. The Kido Butai departed the Kurile Islands. A secret White House conference was convened to determine how the Japanese could be maneuvered into attacking first, hopefully without Americans suffering too much damage. And on that day, the Vacant Sea Order was issued, which cleared the way for the Japanese attack force.

  On November 26, knowing that the Japanese were on their way, FDR ordered that the modus vivendi, which would have provided a diplomatic cooling-off period, be replaced with the Ten Point Note which, in essence, demanded war. And on November 27, 1941, the eleventh day before the Pearl Harbor attack, the weak and ambiguous war warnings were sent to Pacific commands which, compared to what Washington actually knew, didn’t warn of a thing. Even by then, the American public had no conception of how drastically their lives would change in just ten more days.

  As a young boy, I had no idea how these events would shape history, but I knew family members and close family friends who would become veterans of Pearl Harbor, Bataan, and Bulkeley’s PT boats, some of whom did not return. After serving a career in the military, and with fifty years of aviation experience, my interest in the Pearl Harbor attack and the fall of the Philippines came naturally.

  Throughout my career, I have aligned myself with numerous organizations whose exploits have held my interest. Those organizations include the Fourth Armored Division Association, the Philippine Scouts Heritage Society, the Army Aviation Association of America, the Eighth Air Force Historical Society of Minnesota, and the Minnesota Aviation Hall of Fame. My ten years of research for this book also includes countless interviews with World War II veterans, many of whom were Pearl Harbor and Bataan survivors; documentary research at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.; correspondence with the Japanese Fighter Pilots’ Association in Tokyo; and base heritage records in Hawaii.

  One cannot count the number of books that have been written about Pearl Harbor, as well as the fall of the Philippines in 1942. Many credible historians have specialized in various aspects of these events, but because the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malaya, and the Indies were all timed to the minute by the Japanese, it is important to report all of these events simultaneously as part of Japan’s major operation. What went wrong for them actually provided the Allies with a warning and time to prepare, an opportunity that was ignored by General MacArthur.

  Given that the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines were so intertwined, through similarities, contradictions, and devastation, it is very disconcerting to consider the disparity in how the Hawaiian and Philippine commanders were treated after the fact.

  Millions of Americans sacrificed much during the war. Two of those Americans, Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short, who had dedicated their lives in service to their country, were also sacrificed to meet the political motivations of the day, while General Douglas MacArthur was actually rewarded. I want readers to know that the real story is not always as it seems. While some will attempt to conceal the facts to suit the purposes of a few, those who open their minds to the underlying themes will discover a story that uncovers the power and politics at play—the power and politics that really opened the door to war.

  Although I originally had no intentions of publishing this manuscript, I have been fascinated with Pearl Harbor since the age of seven. After transcribing my work, Marilyn Curski, a World War II enthusiast, convinced me that perhaps a reminder was due Americans of the actual events surrounding the Pearl Harbor disaster. Over the next several years, she helped me with countless additions, revisions, and editing, for which I am very grateful.

  And to my wife, Dorothea, I owe my deepest gratitude for her patience and all the sacrifices she made on my behalf throughout this entire project. Without her support and understanding, it may have otherwise wound up buried in a closet.

  Principal Characters

  UNITED STATES

  President Franklin D. Roosevelt

  Secretary of State Cordell Hull

  Secretary of War Henry Stimson

  Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox

  Rear Admiral Walter Anderson — Commander Battleships, Pacific Fleet

  Colonel Rufus Bratton — Chief, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division

  Brigadier General Lewis Brereton — Air Force Commander, Philippines

  General Leonard Gerow — Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division

  Joseph Grew — United States Ambassador to Japan

  Admiral Thomas Hart — Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet

  Harry Hopkins — Advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt

  Admiral Husband Kimmel — Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

  Lieutenant Commander Alvin Kramer — Section Chief, Naval Intelligence

  General Douglas MacArthur — Commanding General, Philippine Department

  Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum — Head of Far Eastern Section, Naval Intelligence

  General George C. Marshall — Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army

  Brigadier General Sherman Miles — Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division

  Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes — Director, Naval Communications

  Lieutenant William Outerbridge — Captain, USS Ward

  Captain Laurence Safford — Head, Communications Security Division, Naval

  Lieutenant General Walter Short — Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

  Admiral Harold Stark — Chief of Naval Operations

  Brigadier General Richard Sutherland — Chief of Staff to General MacArthur

  Rear Admiral Richmond Turner — Director of War Plans

  Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson — Director, Naval Intelligence

  JAPAN

  Emperor Hirohito

  Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye

  Prime Minister Hideki Tojo

  Lieutenant Commander Mitsuo Fuchida — Commander, Air Group, Kido Butai

  Captain Minoru Genda — Mastermind, Pearl Harbor Attack

  Kensuke Horinouchi — Japanese Ambassador to the United States

  Saburo Kurusu — Japanese Ambassador to the United States

  Yosuke Matsuoka — Minister of Foreign Affairs

  Admiral Osami Nagano — Chief of General Naval Staff

  Admiral Chuichi Nagumo — Commander-in-Chief, First Air Fleet, Kido Butai

  Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura — Japanese Ambassador to the United States

  Admiral Koshiro Oikawa — Naval Minister

  Shigenori Togo — Minister of Foreign Affairs

  Admiral Teijiro Toyoda — Minister of Foreign Affairs

  Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto — Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet

  Introduction

  Where does the responsibility really lie for the disaster at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941? Were Admiral Kimmel and General Short, who were so readily relieved of their commands, actually at fault? Or were there underlying political motives and maneuverings at play? November 26, 1941, a day as catastrophic as December 7, would be the day that changed everything in Washington.

  Those who question the highly publicized versions that Kimmel and Short were derelict in their duties find it ironic that General Douglas MacArthur allowed the Philippines to fall into the hands of the Japanese, an event that resulted in significantly higher casualties. How could two commanders be relieved for not acting on intelligence they didn’t receive when a third commander was rewarded for not acting on the same intelligence he did receive? Washington’s buy-in of MacArthur’s grandiose plan to save the Philippines only hastened its early defeat, and essentially, the destruction of U.S. air power in the western Pacific. While Kimmel and Short were called to task in at least nine investigations following Pearl Harbor, MacArthur’s inactions were never even questioned. Instead, he was given greater responsibility and eventually acclaimed a hero. How could two commanders live the balance of their lives in public shame while the third became a millionaire and was awarded the Medal of Honor?

  In the following pages, the author sets the record straight, providing evidence of failed communications, ignored intelligence, and poor military planning that led to Americans’ early defeats in World War II. This book addresses the parallel events in Europe, often overlooked in many accounts of Pearl Harbor, particularly on December 7 with Hitler at the gates of Moscow, and the speculations of and ramifications for Japan’s Tripartite partner, Germany. The chapters also detail the decisions that forced Kimmel and Short into retirement; the dispersion of military armaments already in short supply; and the actions of a leader who ambiguously swayed the American people and contradicted international law.

  Then there were the yachts, FDR’s last-minute attempt to invite Japan to shoot first. And contrary to the specific orders not to shoot, it would be a commander at Pearl Harbor who would open the war with Japan.

  Most Americans are under the impression that the United States entered World War II when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was attacked to no insignificant extent because President Roosevelt, aided by the Democratic majority in both Houses, passed the Lend-Lease Act. Lend-Lease, which was passed a full nine months prior to Pearl Harbor, gave unlimited military aid to any nation at war with any member of the Tripartite Pact, all at American taxpayer expense. It put weapons into the hands of Great Britain, Greece, and Russia in their wars with Germany. Using the Burma Road and planes, it delivered supplies and weapons through the back door of China to Chiang Kai-Shek in his defensive war with Japan. American military aid to these warring nations clearly breached international law, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the natural response.

  Contrary to the most commonly told story of Pearl Harbor, the president knew thirteen days before the “day of infamy” that the Japanese task force was coming. And as the congressional hearings would later reveal, the administration cleared the way for them with the issuance of the Vacant Sea Order. Presented here are the chronological events leading up to the Ten Point Note, the final ultimatum issued Japan. And although there were attempts by leaders of both sides to meet and settle differences, each one was ill-timed and turned down by the other side.

  With over seventy years to examine the events of history, there remains absolutely no doubt that President Roosevelt and his cabinet did much to make the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor inevitable. There is wide disagreement, however, on what the result of the alternatives would have been. This book does not venture into such speculation; rather it reports the events as they occurred, as well as the subsequent fending or parrying of each political action that resulted on both sides.

  The argument has been made that, while serving as President Woodrow Wilson’s assistant secretary of the navy during World War I, Franklin Roosevelt had developed such a great devotion to the U.S. Navy that the thought of allowing a surprise attack on it would have been personally irreconcilable. This opinion has prevailed among many, cementing the notion that there is no evidence that the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was not a complete surprise. Yet it is obvious that those who claim there is no such evidence have either refused to look for it, or to look at the American leadership during the years when the nation was emerging from the Depression and about to enter another world war.

  The premise of this book is that the president and his cabinet, with the aid of the Democratic platform, had the ability to make the decision as to when the United States would enter World War II. Policies and dictates of the president, with the endorsement of his cabinet, may not both have had the power to prevent a Pearl Harbor, but they certainly had the ability to postpone the Japanese attack for at least several months. Those critical months would have allowed time to build up American forces in the Philippines and on U.S. Pacific outposts. With additional time provided the Americans, would Japan have risked such an attack?

  Even members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs disagreed with the decisions made on Capitol Hill that made war a certainty. The Americans’ ability to read Japanese Purple diplomatic intelligence provided the capacity, even in the eleventh hour, to alter the inevitable. By supplying war material, overhauling British warships, employing naval convoys in the Atlantic, and moving to occupy Iceland and Greenland, the Americans were as much an aggressor as any foreign power.

  In late August 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Prince Konoye sent a personal message to the president, through Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, suggesting that the two of them sit down in a neutral environment to reach a settlement of their respective differences. FDR’s conditions for such a meeting were so difficult that the Japanese government backed down. It was known in Washington that such a rejection of this meeting would topple the moderate Konoye government in favor of the militant Tojo cabinet.

  Island of Oahu

  And that is exactly what happened in October 1941 when General Hideki Tojo became Japan’s Prime Minister. There was no question that war was coming. But rather than blindly moving ahead with decisions that no longer addressed the problems or raised solutions, the admi
nistration could have modified hard and established dictates to meet each situation. Even up to two weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack, there was still a unique opportunity to stave off a war for another three months, an opportunity that was officially shunned; the modus vivendi to forestall an attack suddenly became the demanding Ten Point Note.

  In November, Japan had sent a second ambassador, Saburo Kurusu, to Washington in the vain hope of assisting in a negotiated settlement of what were unthinkable alternatives. Even decisions made on the Japanese embargo in July 1941 were argued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To all of this, one might add dereliction of duty. There was absolutely no attempt to organize the Allies or establish unity of command, both duties that belonged to the president. The British and the Dutch in the Pacific were left in the dark as to what U.S. policy would be in the event of attack. After all, the aircraft carriers stationed at Pearl Harbor, Japan’s main targets, had conveniently left port.

  Even Admiral Nagumo’s message of December 2, “Niitaka Yama Nobore, 1208,” or “Climb Mount Niitaka, 1208 Repeat 1208,”1 was an eleventh-hour instruction that nothing had changed in the American hard line that would cause the Japanese to cancel the Pearl Harbor attack. The American government had just let the last opportunity to gain valuable time slip away, and that lead to chaos. For a strike that had its origins twelve months earlier, the Japanese had held out until the last minute. But in the end, it was America’s friends and allies who closed the door to any final negotiations favorable to the United States.

  Shifting to the Philippines, this book also chronicles General Douglas MacArthur’s acceptance of the leadership role in defense of the Philippines. His complete disregard of the long-established strategy for the islands’ defense led to his grandiose replacement plan, which fell apart as soon as the shooting started. MacArthur’s micromanagement in the defense of Bataan, geared to keeping him in the limelight, came at the expense of military logic, sealing the fate of those left behind to defend the peninsula. Defying orders, he took key military leadership with him when he left the Philippines, which only added to some of the chaos he had created. There were no investigations following the initial attack on the Philippines.